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Oregon's Project to Codify Choice-of-Law Rules
James 4.R. Nafziger*

On the arid plateau of American choice-of-law legislation, one figure looms

large: Symeon Symeonides. His work as Reporter of Louisiana's comprehensive
codification of choice-of-law rules and as Co-Rapporteur of a similar project in
Puerto Rico are exemplary. The unanimity ofthe Louisiana legislature's enactment

of the conflicts law testifies also to the political savvy that Dean Symeonides must
have exercised in a notoriously political state. Fortunately for us in Oregon, his
pioneering scholarship and diplomatic skill are already assisting the state in its

second-in-the-nation project to enact choice-of-law rules.
The first project of the new Oregon Law Commission' to be initiated outside
the state legislature is directed toward codification of choice-of-law rules.2 Oregon
is thus the second state, after Louisiana,' to undertake to do so. This report analyzes
and summarizes Oregon's checkered conflicts jurisprudence and suggests
alternatives for statutory reform.
I. BACKGROUND

A. The Choice-of-Law Project
In 1998 the Oregon Law Commission began to develop legislative initiatives

and invited outside proposals for law reform projects, in response to which I
submitted a proposal in May 1998 to draft choice-of-law rules. The Commission
decided in September 1998 to undertake the project. On the Commission's request,
I met in December 1998 with two of its members, Chief Justice Wallace Carson of
the Oregon Supreme Court and Professor Dom V6tri of the University of Oregon
School ofLaw, to begin planning the project. In January 2000, a newly organized
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Thomas B. Stoel Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. The author
expresses his appreciation to Juan Aguiar and Keliang Zhu for their excellent research assistance.
1. In 1997, Oregon became "at least" the sixteenth state to establish a commission for revising
local law, premised like its sister-state bodies in the advocacy of Jeremy Bentham, Benjamin Cardozo
and Roscoe Pound for special governmental bodies to conduct law revision. See Dominick Vetri,
Communicating Between Planets: Law Reform for the Twenty-First Century, 34 Willamette L. Rev.
169, 171, 172-74 (1998). For background, see also Hans A. Linde, Law Revision in Oregon, 20
Willamette L. Rev. 211, 218 (1984). InDecember 1998 the Commission, having invited proposals
from law schools within the state for cooperative administration of the Commission, selected the
Willamette University College of Law to serve in that capacity.
2. That is, rules to guide the judiciary in choosing the appropriate law to govem multijurisdictional issues.
3. For a description of the Louisiana codification, including its drafting history, see Symeon C.
Symeonides, Private International Law Codification in a Mixed Jurisdiction: The Louisiana
Experience, 57 Rabels Zeitschrift flr auslandisches und internationales Privatrecht 460 (1993); see also
Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana's New Law ofChoice ofLaw for Tort Conflicts: An Exegesis, 66
Tul. L. Rev. 677 (1992) [hereinafter Louisiana Tort Conflicts].
*
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study group4 decided to focus initially on choice-of-law rules for contract and tort
cases.
Willis Reese, Hans Linde and Symeon Symeonides inspired my proposal.
Years ago, Professor Reese, the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, expressed to me his bewilderment with Oregon's choiceof-law process, purportedly based upon the Restatement (Second) but of
derelict application. He suggested a need for further analysis of the rather
complicated case law as a first step toward the formulation of clearer rules.
More recently, when the Commission began to look around for projects, one
of its pioneer members, Professor Linde, suggested that I initiate a proposal for
codifying choice-of-law rules. During the first meeting of our planning group, in
December 1998, we decided to invite Dean Symeonides, then of the Louisiana State
University faculty, to serve as an outside consultant. The logistics of involving him
in the project were eased several months later when Willamette University
appointed Professor Symeonides as Dean of the College of Law, commencing in
July 1999.
II. OREGON'S CHOICE-OF-LAW APPROACH

A. Background
Until 1962, Oregon courts, like those in most states, applied territorialist,
jurisdiction-selecting rules-such as the law of the place of wrong, the law of the
place of executing a contract, and the law of the place ofperforming a contract-for
choosing the applicable law in multi-jurisdictional disputes.' These black-letter
rules were based on a doctrine of vested rights, according to which rights become
attached to persons, events and activities at prescribed points in time and space.
The territorialist rules, as they became known, generally served, or were thought to
serve, several important functions of thejudicial process: simplicity, predictability,
ease ofjudicial administration, and avoidance of forum shopping. As time went on,
however, it became apparent that formulation of the rules did not take sufficient
account of the functions and purposes of the rules themselves. The rules seemed
more and more artificial. Moreover, interpretation ofthe rules over time and space
produced conflicting results, and creditable application of the rules required a
variety of legal fictions and techniques. Finally, the rather mechanical application
ofjurisdiction-selecting rules did not necessarily produce justice in the individual
case.
4. The Study Group on Conflict of Laws was organized on the basis of expertise, practical
experience and representation of bench and bar. The members are: J. Michael Alexander, Wallace
Carson, Mildred Carmack, Susan Grabe, Jonathan Hoffman, Maurice Holland, Douglas Houser, Hans
Linde, Donald Large, James Nafziger (Reporter), Eugene Scoles, Willaim Snouffer, Symeon
Symeonides, Dominick Vetri (Chair); Exofficio: Rep. Lane Shetterly, Chair, Oregon Law Commission;
Sen. Kate Brown; David Heynderickx, Oregon Legislative Counsel's Office.
5. These rules are enshrined in the Restatement (First) ofConflicts (1934), which is identified
with its Reporter, Professor Joseph Beale.
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As time went on, courts began to find ways to avoid unjust or simply
undesirable results. Use of a public policy exception, manipulation of the
substance-procedural characterization of an issue, and recourse to renvoi, for
example, eased the judicial conscience. 6 Gradually, courts began to shift their focus
away from the choice of the appropriate jurisdiction, whose law was to be applied
mechanically to govern an entire case, to the choice of the appropriate law
to resolve a specific issue. This represented a shift from multilateralism,
which seeks uniform choice-of-law results wherever a case is brought, to
which seeks to define the intended or otherwise appropriate
unilateralism,
spatial reach of conflicting rules, and substantivism, which instructs
courts
to apply the best available substantive law regardless of the goal of
multijurisdictional uniformity or the reach of a particular rule.7 The new learning
encouraged the shift toward unilateralism and substantivismby analyzing, variously,
such factors as the intended scope of a particular rule of law, its purpose and
function(s), its salience for the governing authority, and its relative value in modem
society.
Under the new learning, courts began to experiment with more or less
prescribed new approaches for resolving conflicts, particularly in contractand tort-related disputes. Most of these approaches share two characteristics.
First, after confirming that a conflict of laws may exist, the modem
approaches typically undertake an evaluation of the significance of particular
contacts between critical events or persons and the jurisdictions whose laws
are ostensibly in conflict, or of the respective interests of those jurisdictions
in having their ostensibly conflicting laws applied to govern the issues in a
case, or a combination of these two modes of evaluation. Second, the
modem approaches encourage an issue-by-issue analysis, engaging, if need
be, in d6pegage of a case into discrete, conflict-relevant issues. The main
approaches, more or less in order of their progression from jurisdictionselecting rules to law-selecting criteria, include gravity of contacts; forum
preference in the absence of a compelling foreign interest to the contrary; the
most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws; governmental interest analysis; comparative impairment analysis; and
choice-influencing considerations, including the "better rule" factor.'
Alternative approaches that have largely remained academic include principles of
preference in contract cases; functional analysis; special substantive rules and
compromises for resolving conflicts, including the "best rule" approach; and
expectations theory.9

6. See,e.g., William M. Richman &William L. Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws 11324 (1984).
7. SeeGene R. Shreve, Choice ofLaw andthe Forgiving Constitution, 71 Ind. L.J.271,282-86
(1996).
8. See, e.g., James E. Westbrook, A Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choice-Of-Law

Methodologies: The CaseforEclecticism, 40 Mo. L.Rev. 407 (1975).
9.

See Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws: Cases and Materials 366-68 (4th ed. 1995).
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B. The Case Law: 1964-85
Oregon case law during the formative period ofthe new choice-of-law learning
has been examined elsewhere.' 0 Three early decisions, however, merit specific
attention.
In Lilienthalv. Kaufman,'" the Oregon Supreme Court joined the vanguard of
the conflicts revolution by adopting a form of governmental interest analysis, at
least to govern contract-related conflicts.' 2 In Lilienthal,the plaintiff, a California
resident, sued an Oregon spendthrift for contracted repayment of a loan that the
defendant had obtained in California. Although California common law would have
upheld the contract, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that Oregon's spendthrift
statute voided it so as to protect the Oregon spendthrift. Having found a true
conflict between California and Oregon law, the court, noting that it was an
instrument of state policy, broke the tie by applying the Oregon spendthrift law.
3
Three years later, in Casey v. Manson Construction&Engineering Co.,' the
Oregon Supreme Court extended the new learning to a torts case for the first time.
In Casey,an Oregon resident brought an action for loss ofconsortium, alleging that
her husband's injury had been caused by the Washington defendant's negligence
during the husband's employment on a project in Washington. An Oregon statute
conferred a right ofconsortium, whereas Washington common law denied a spouse
the right to sue for loss of consortium. The court, citing Lilienthal,undertook a
form ofinterest analysis, concluding that although the dispute implicated substantial
interests ofboth states, Washington had a more significant relationship with the
occurrence and the parties. The court therefore applied Washington law to bar
recovery. In weighing the respective state interests in this way to resolve what
would otherwise be a true conflict, the court appeared to adopt the approach taken
in the new Restatement (Second).
In Erwin v. Thomas," another Washington-related action for loss of
consortium, a Washington plaintiffbrought an action against an Oregon defendant
to recover for loss of consortium related to her husband's injury in Washington.

10.

See James A.R. Nafziger, Conflict of Laws: A Northwest Perspective 136-60 (1985). For

further elaboration on insurance-related conflicts issues during the formative period ofthe newlearning,
including the texts of pertinent choice-of-law methodologies, see James A.R. Nafziger, InsuranceRelated ConflictofLaws, in Oregon State Bar, I Insurance §2.4 (1983) [hereinafter Insurance-Related
Conflicts].
11. 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964).
12. Although Oregon courts have often described Lilienthal as aRestatement (Second) case, the
scholarship is virtually unanimous in describing it as an interest analysis case, although the majority
opinion does cite aTentative Draft of the Restatement (Second). See Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 237;
Cramton et al., Conflict of Laws: Cases- Comments-Questions 175 (5th ed. 1993); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Conflict of Laws: Federal, State, and International Perspectives 232, 243 (2d ed. 1998);

Richman & Reynolds, supra note 6,at 180; Eugene F. Scoles & Peter Hay et al., Conflict of Laws 77
(3d ed. 2000); Symeon C. Symeonides et. al, Conflict of Laws: American, Comparative, International:
Cases and Materials 188 (1998).
13. 428 P.2d 898 (Or. 1967).
14.

506 P.2d 494 (Or. 1973).
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The court concluded that Washington had no material interest in the matter because
no Washington defendant had been required to respond to the plaintiff's clain.
(The court did not explain why the potential extension ofinsurance proceeds to the
Washington plaintiff, even if Washington would not have so provided for them in
a wholly localcase, might not be ofinterest to that state. The inclination ofcourts
applying the modem approaches is to define governmental interests in terms of
benefiting their residents and domiciliaries in the context ofresolving a conflict of
laws.)' 5 The court then determined that Oregon had no material interest because the
Oregon legislature likely was unconcerned about the rights ofnon-resident wives
whose husbands were injured outside the state. Thus, the court was faced with the
"unprovided for" case where neither state could claim an interest in having its law
applied. The court decided to do "what comes naturally" by applying forum law,
finding no need to resort to the most significant relationship test ofthe Restatement
(Second), so recently used to resolve a true conflict in Casey.
Since Caseyand Erwin, Oregon courts have fairly consistently paid lip service
to the Restatement (Second) approach in both tort- and contract-related conflicts.
The real questions are, however, whether the courts actually apply those rules
faithfully and consistently and, if not, whether non-conformity to the stipulated
methodology makes any difference.
Generally, the following characteristics ofOregon's approach emerged during
6
the first two decades ofjudicial experimentation with the new learning:'
1. Oregon courts would follow a statutory directive on choice of law.
2. As in most states, Oregon courts continued to apply traditional,
territorialist rules to resolve issues other than those involving contracts and
torts. For example, interstate or international transfers ofreal property are
governed by the law ofthe situs (lex reisitae).7
3. In tort and contract cases a forum preference which is characteristic of
all modem approaches dominated decisions. Oregon courts almost always
applied local law to resolve contract- and tort-related conflicts. Caseyand
Fisherv. Huck,"8 the latter a case involving co-domiciliaries of a foreign
15. It is, therefore, somewhat simplistic to argue that the Erwin facts posed no potential conflict
at all insofar as the plaintiff had no cause of action under either the law of her domicile (Washington),
which did not provide damages for loss of consortium, or forum law (Oregon), which presumably had
no interest in protecting a non-domiciliary and which therefore would have to provide such damages
only on the basis of the domicile in Oregon of a defendant whom Oregon would be inclined to protect
from liability. But see Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 304-05
(1990).
16. See also Nafziger, supra note 10, at 144-48.
17. See, e.g., Fry v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 525 P.2d 140 (Or. 1974).
18. 624 P.2d 177 (Or. App. 1981). This decision is nationally renowned for its observation that:
[w]hen any court embarks on a determination of the 'relevant policies ofother interested
states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue'
[Restatement (Second) §6], the endeavor, in many instances, is like skeet shooting with a
bow and arrow: a direct hit is likely to be a rarity, if not pure luck. With that chance of
success in mind, we nock the arrow and draw the string.
Id. at 178 (footnote omitted).
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jurisdiction, are the major exceptions; they not only chose foreign law but
cautioned against forum chauvinism.' 9
4. The appellate courts have adopted an eclectic approach in contract and
tort cases. In the well-known words of Lilienthal,Oregon courts continue
to "refrain from making any pronouncements which might in the future
restrain [them] from taking [a new course]."'° Although the courts have
usually described the applicable methodology to be some variant of the
Restatement (Second), the overall approach taken has been more of a
hybrid of gravity of contacts enumeration, governmental interest analysis,
and Restatement (Second) methodology.
5. Leading decisions are often difficult to reconcile with each other.
Take, for example, the three formative cases of Lilienthal, Casey, and
Erwin. Why should an unsuspecting California party in a California-based
transaction be subject to Oregon's unusual spendthrift law while a
Washington party affected by an Oregon defendant's activity within
Washington cannot avail herselfof Oregon's more normal rule ofrecovery
for loss of consortium? Comparing the same cases, why should the court
be decisively concerned about the expectations of outsiders in tort cases
(Casey) but not in contracts cases (Lilienthal)when the expectations of
parties are incidental to tort law and paramount in contract law? Why are
the interests of a foreign jurisdiction in protecting persons (and
prospective defendants) doing business there so important in Casey but
largely devalued in Erwin? Why, after reversing the domiciles of the
defendants as between Casey and Erwin, is Oregon more interested in
protecting a Washington plaintiff whom the Oregon law did not seek to
protect (Erwin) than an Oregon plaintiff whom the Oregon law did seek
to protect (Casey)? Why is Washington's protective interest interpreted
to extend only to its own resident defendants (Casey) and not to nonresidents licensed and perhaps even encouraged to do business there,
ostensibly for the benefit of Washingtonians (Erwin)?
If any rules can be drawn from the first twenty years of Oregon's experiment
with modem choice-of-law methodology, they seem to be as follows:

19. "[W]e are warned by highly regarded authority that '[s]tate chauvinism and interstate
retaliation are dangers to be avoided." Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'g Co., 428 P.2d at 898, 907
(Or. 1967) (footnote omitted).
20. Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543, 544 (Or. 1964). Erwin added the following
observation:
Our confidence in any set body of rules as an all-encompassing and readily applicable
means ofsolution to conflict cases isnot so great that we desire to undertakethe application
of such rules except in those situations where the policies and interests of the respective
states are in substantial opposition. We see no such conflict here and, therefore, find it
unnecessary to resort to any such set of rules. We are little concerned whether we are
presented with a false conflict or with an actual conflict capable of solution by resorting to

our analysis of the interests and policies of the respective states.
506 P.2d at 497.
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1. The status of persons as residents or domiciliaries, particularly
Oregonians, is of greater interest than the territoriality of events or
actions. 2

2. Where neither jurisdiction has a substantial interest in the outcome of
litigation, the lexfori will be applied.
3. Where only Oregon's interests and policies are involved, or the parties
are both Oregon domiciliaries, the lexfori will be applied.
4. Where the foreign jurisdiction, but not Oregon, has an interest, the
foreign law will be applied.
5. Where there is an actual or true conflict between the laws of
Oregon and another jurisdiction, and the laws are of substantial
interest and equal importance to each jurisdiction, Oregon's law will
be applied, at least in contracts cases. In tort cases it may be that
the most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Second) will be
applied.
C The Case Law: 1986 to the Present
Oregon conflicts decisions since 1986 (see Annex) generally confirm the
homeward trend and other characteristics ofthe state's choice-of-lawjurisprudence
as it emerged during the first two decades of the new learning.22 Although Oregon
courts have chosen foreign law on several occasions in recent years, in one ofthose
cases they did so when Oregon law was not at issue and, in two others, when the
foreign law clearly favored Oregon parties.2 3 Formally, Oregon courts have
continued to look to the Restatement (Second) for guidance, but the methodology
applied has been extraordinarily varied.
The most common methodology has involved a two-step test, according to
which the courts are to determine whether there is an actual conflict before
proceeding to ask which legal system has the most (or more) significant relationship
to the case. Although the courts fairly consistently phrase the test that way, they
typically undertake the first step only to determine whether there is an ostensible
conflict. After all, if the analysis is to rely on some sort of most significant
relationship or governmental interest analysis, the court could hardly conclude in
21. This seems to be characteristic of interest analysis. See, e.g., P. John Kozyris, Postscript:
InterestAnalysis FacingIts Critics-And,Incidentally, What Should be Done About Choice ofLaw
for Products Liability?,46 Ohio St. L. J.569, 573 (1985). But see Erwin, 506 P.2d at 494.
22. This compilation includes conflict-relevant information about all reported decisions by the
Oregon Supreme Court and Oregon Court of Appeals of any significance and a few of the most
important federal court decisions. See also Insurance-Related Conflicts, supranote 10, at §2.4 (1992
Supp.). The compilation does not include several decisions involving interstate criminal conflicts of
law, decisions where facts pertinent to a conflicts issue had been insufficiently pleaded, or decisions
that the pertinent foreign and local law were materially the same or would produce the same result.
23. Manz v. Continental Am. Life Ins. Co., 843 P.2d 480 (Or. App. 1992) (a conflict not
involving Oregon law); Webber v.Olsen, 971 P.2d 448 (Or. App. 1998); and Stricklin v. Soued, 936
P.2d 398 (Or. App. 1997) (choice of foreign law favored Oregon parties).
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the first step that there is an "actual" conflict before determining, in the second step,
where the most significant relationship or interests lie.
Sometimes the court's analysis is indistinguishable from a more or less
mechanical gravity ofcontacts approach.24 Sometimes the opinions weigh opposing
governmental interests, typically finding a false conflict, during an analysis ofthe
most significant "contacts" or "relationships," but seldom do the opinions reveal
careful attention to the complex policies underlying conflicting laws. Indeed, the
role assigned by Lilienthal to public policy as a critical factor in the analysis
remains vague. Sometimes it dominates the analysis from start to finish as a sort of
parochial ordrepublicexception to a normal choice offoreign law;" at other times,
it serves (as it should) to define significance of a particular contact or territorial
relationship.2" At still other times, Oregon's public policy serves as the so-called
third step in a three-step test that was derived, it is said, from Lilienthal. According
to this methodology, public policy may serve either as a tie-breaker to resolve a true
conflict, as in Lilienthalitself, or, even more expansively, to trump foreign law even
when the foreign jurisdiction is deemed to have the most significant relationship
with a case or particular issue in a case.29 Finally, the courts have occasionally
abandoned any pretense of policy-and-interests methodology in favor of a form of
neoterritorialism. °
Decisions of federal courts applying Oregon choice-of-law rules in
diversity-of-citizenship cases have ranged from a pure gravity of contacts
analysis in 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold," a Ninth Circuit opinion, to
Frosty v. Textron, Inc. 2 and Pallen v. United Parcel Services General
Services Co.,33 United States District Court opinions that carefully applied

24. See, e.g., Webber v. Olsen, 971 P.2d 448 (Or. App. 1998); Holder v. EIg, 948 P.2d 763 (Or.
App. 1997); Straight Grain Builders v. Track N' Trail, 760 P.2d 1350 (Or. App. 1988) (in its
determination of aparity ofsignificant relationships with California and Oregon); Citizens First Bank
v. Intercontinental Express, Inc., 713 P.2d 1097 (Or. App. 1986); Young v.Mobil Oil Corp., 735 P.2d
654 (Or. App. 1987) isparticularly interesting in citing Haag v.Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. App.
1961), apremier gravity-of-contacts analysis, as what the Oregon court mistakenly considered to be the
leading authority on "the significant relationship test adopted by New York courts."
25. See. e.g. Manz, 843 P.2d at 480; Dobbs v. Silver Eagle Mfg. Co., 779 P.2d 1104 (Or. App.
1989); Straight Grain Builders, 760 P.2d at 1350.
26. In Lilienthal itself, public policy was the tie breaker for resolving a true conflict between
California and Oregon law.
27.

See, e.g.. Young, 735 P.2d at 654.

28. See e.g., Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. McKay, 760 P.2d 871 (Or. 1988) (policyrationale
of applying the lexfori to govern issues ofjudicial administration).
29. See, e.g., Webber, 971 P.2d at 448; St. Paul Fire &Marine Ins. Co. v. McCormick & Baxter
Creosoting Co, 870 P.2d 260 (Or. App.), modified, 875 P.2d 537 (1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
923 P.2d 1200 (Or. 1996); Straight Grain Builders, 760 P.2d at 1350.
30. See Cropp v. Interstate Distrib. Co., 880 P.2d 464 (Or. App.), review denied, 887 P.2d 791

(1994).
31. 179 F.3d 656 (9th Cir. 1999).
32. 891 F. Supp. 551 (D. Or. 1995).
33. 997 F. Supp. 1367 (D.Or. 1998) (and several companion cases that are identical on the
conflicts issue and its resolution).
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Oregon's hybrid methodology in a manner consistent with the basic
formulations in Lilienthal and Casey. The two district court opinions are
models of careful articulation and stare decisis.
The methodological eclecticism and resulting ambiguity, or perhaps confusion,
ofthe Oregon case law is not necessarily bad. After all, a foolish consistency may
be the hobgoblin of little minds. Material justice is ultimately what matters most.
In any event, some inconsistency should not be surprising insofar as the modem
approaches encourage judicial discretion and experimentation. Nor is Oregon
unique; eclectic, hybrid methodologies have developed throughout the United
States. 4 Moreover, even strict adherence to a particular methodology or approach
would not ensure consistency, as the long experience with territorialist rules
certainly demonstrated. Reasonable judicial minds may differ on both the integrity
ofthe court's use ofthe methodology and the justice ofthe result. Thus, the debate
over eclecticism is far from over.35
The real question is whether methodological eclecticism produces unexpected
or doubtful results in a substantial percentage of conflicts decisions. Unfortunately,
the answer seems to be "yes" in Oregon. For example, it is hard to justify the
decision in Young v. Mobil Oil Co. 6 to void a reasonable choice-of-law clause
agreed upon by two business entities, absent any element of adhesion. The New
York law would have simply provided indemnification for the payment of a
settlement, posing little or no threat to workplace safety as the court seemed to fear.
It is also hard to justify the choice of Oregon law in Straight GrainBuilders v.

Track N' Trail,37 the result ofwhich was to uphold an implied-in-fact contract that
was illegal and void in California where it was to be performed (because of the
failure ofan Oregon contractor to obtain the required building license). Clearly the
contract would have been unenforceable in California had the breach-of-contract
action been brought there. This encouragement of forum shopping is all the more
curious in view of a decision the following year in IndustrialIndemnity v. Pacific
MaritimeAssociation." There, the court applied California law partly to avert the
"anomaly" of three potential fora, reaching three different results on the same
issues. What is more, the reliance of Straight Grain Builders on the validation
principle to uphold a California-based contract in favor of an Oregon party is hard
to reconcile with Lilienthal'srefusal to rely on the same principle to uphold another
California-based contract, in that instance to the detriment of an Oregon party.
34. Some nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted a "combined modem" approach
in torts, contracts or both kinds of cases. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American
Courts in 1995: A Year in Review, 44 Am. J. Comp. L. 181, 195 (1996). In addition, it is likely that

the states whose courts have adopted either the Restatement (Second) orinterest analysis have employed
multiple methodologies and approaches. See also William Tetley, A CanadianLooks at American
Conflict ofLaw Theoryand Practice. Especiallyin theLight ofthe American Legal andSocialSystems

(Corrective vs. DistributiveJustice), 38 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 299, 322-23 (1999).
35. For an enlightening collection of writings on both sides of this debate, see Gene R. Shreve,
A Conflict-of-Laws Anthology 229-41 (1997).

36.
37.
38.

735 P.2d 654 (Or. App. 1987).
760 P.2d 1350 (Or. App. 1988).
777 P.2d 1385 (Or. App. 1989).
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In Cropp v. Interstate DistributionCo. 9 the court, in pristinely selecting the
law of the place of wrong to determine a statute-of-limitations issue, confused the
circumstances of the wrong itself-for example, was the driver negligent?-with
the conflicts issue between the parties. A lengthy and thoughtful dissent reminded
the majority of the integrity of Oregon's hybrid conflicts methodology premised on
the Restatement (Second) and the issue-specific premise of modem conflicts
analysis.40 Unfortunately, the majority opinion in Croppis only the most obvious
example of a tendency of Oregon courts to apply a single analysis of contacts in a
case to all issues in it. It is beyond the scope of this commentary to speculate on
how an issue-specific approach might have changed the outcome in particular cases.
Suffice it to say that d6pegage can, indeed, affect results and certainly would have
done so in Cropp.
Finally, it is difficult to reconcile two decisions involving Californiabased transactions. In Webber v. Olsen,4t California's relatively high standard
for notification of a change of beneficiary in an insurance policy was applied
to the advantage of an Oregon resident who had little direct contact with
California, whereas in Straight Grain Builders, California's construction
licensing requirement was not applied when it would have been harmful to
an Oregon resident with substantial involvement in California directly bearing

on the breach-of-contract issues in the case. The best explanation for these
two decisions would seem to lie in a result-oriented protection of Oregon
domiciliaries.
III. STATUTORY OPPORTUNITIES

A. Choice-of-Law Rulemaking
An underlying premise of the so-called conflicts revolution in the United States
is that experimentation with the new approaches not only would replace the
mechanical application of territorialist rules, but would eventually lead to the
formulation ofnew sets ofrules based upon emerging patterns ofjudicial decisions.
'
Professor David Cavers' "principles of preference"42
and New York Court of
Appeals Judge Fuld's principles to govern guest statute cases (the so-called
39. 880 P.2d 464 (Or. App. 1994).
40. When a true conflict exists, i.e., when both Oregon and the other state have a substantial
interest in the outcome of the disputed issue, then the question becomes which state has the greater
interest-the most "significant relationship" to the case....

The majority is misdirected by its assumption that, because the accident occurred on California's
highways, California substantive law necessarily applies to the entire case. That conclusion begs the
question. A complete analysis of all the factors relevant to the question of which state's substantive law
applies can lead to only one result: Because of Oregon's substantial interest in the outcome ofthis case
and California's negligible interest, Oregon's substantive law is applicable and, pursuant to ORS
12.430(2), so is its two-year statute of limitations.
880 P.2d at 468 (Rossman, J., dissenting).
41. 971 P.2d 448 (Or. App. 1998).
42. See David F. Cavers, The Choice of Law Process (1965).
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Neumeier"rules"43
) are early expressions of this aspiration. In the many years since
Judge Fuld formulated the Neumeierrules, however, they have been only modestly
extended, by analogy, beyond guest statute cases, and there has been little or no
effort otherwise to develop other common law rules or principles of preference.
Although Louisiana is the only one of the United States to have enacted a
comprehensive choice-of-law code, some 25 civil law jurisdictions abroad have
done so during the last four decades." This trend has been described as the
"way of the future."45 Regional agreements on choice-of-law rules have also
been reached in recent years." Of course, it might be expected that civil law
jurisdictions would be the first to codify choice-of-law rules-in the United States,
for example, uniquely civilian Louisiana came first-but there is no inherent
correlation between the character of the legal system and the utility of codifying
conflicts rules.
Statutory choice-of-law rules govern some legal subjects in Oregon, notably
commercial transactions,47 limitation of judicial actions,"' unclaimed property,49
child custody," family support,5 wills and gifts,52 environmental cleanup
assistance,53 and transboundary pollution.' Would more general codification of
Oregon choice-of-law rules be worthwhile? Impressionistically, the answer would
seem to be "yes" or perhaps "why not?", in view of the ambiguities in the judicial
formulations ofchoice-of-law rules and the inconsistencies in their application from
one case to the next. But, as the Louisiana experience suggests,55 the drafting
agenda is challenging if not daunting.
A study of judicial decisions under Louisiana's comprehensive conflicts
statute56 suggests that codification may, indeed, be worth the effort. The study
concluded that the Louisiana statute has, in fact, enhanced the predictability of
judicial decisions in that state. The pre-codification rate of appellate court
affirmance of trial court conflicts decisions was 52.9% whereas for post-

43.
44.

See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).
See Eugene F. Scoles, et. al., Conflict of Laws 110-13 (3d ed., 2000) (noting reappearance

of the Savignian concept of the seat of the relationship in "closest connection" methodology and
similarities with Restatement (Second) formulations). Id.at 114. See also William Tetley, International
Conflict of Laws: Common, Civil and Maritime (1994); C.G.J. Morse, Choice of Law in Tort: A
Comparative Survey, 32 Am. J. Comp. L. 51 (1984).
45. Tetley, supra note 34, at 306, 321-22 (arguing that the United States, in not following this
trend (except for Louisiana), is "out of step").
46. Id.
47. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 71.1050, 72A.1050, 74A.5070, 78.1100, 79.1030 (1999).
48. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 12.430-50 (1999).

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 98.304, 98.348, 98.424 (1999).
Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 109.700-890 (1999).
Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 110.321, 110.411 (1999).
Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 112.230, 112.255, 126.809 (1999).
Or. Rev. Stat. § 465.480 (1999).
Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.080 (1999).

55. See Symeonides, supra note 3 (both cited articles).
56. Patrick J. Borchers, Louisiana's Conflicts Codification: Some Empirical Observations
Regarding Decisional Predictability, 60 La. L. Rev. 1061 (2000).
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codification decisions, the affimance rate improved to 76.2%. These statistics may
not be free from question, but they are significant.
B.

The Alternativesfor Oregon

The ample literature on codifying conflicts law57 suggests-two general levels
of choice-of-law codification that might be described, respectively, as "macro" and
"micro." At a "macro" level, one statutory alternative would be simply to provide
for the application of a designated methodology-for example, "governmental
interest analysis" or "Restatement (Second) rules" to govern at least a range of
disputes. The designated methodology might be explicitly articulated-for
example, by reiterating the actual steps prescribed by Professor Currie for interest
analysis or the matrix of considerations in section 6 ofthe Restatement (Second) to
determine the most significant relationship. Such a project might help stabilize
expectations, in some measure enhance predictability, and generally confine the
framework of judicial decision-making in conflicts cases. The real issues are not
limited to methodological classification, however. Rather, they involve serious
inconsistencies and unfairness in applying whatever methodology is adopted. A
"macro" approach to codification would therefore be of limited value.
It is preferable, instead, to undertake a more issue-specific "micro" approach
in which precise rules are fashioned to govern specific issues, more or less
according to the aspiration, if not the result, of the Restatement (Second). One is
then confronted with the usual range of methodological alternatives-which one is
suitable for Oregon? Elsewhere I have argued that a choice-of-law codification
should bear some resemblance to actual practice.5" With reference to the Complex
Litigation Project ofthe American Law Institute (ALI), my analysis of choice of law
in complex litigation of all reported air disaster cases revealed a significant
inconsistency between the decisions in consolidated federal cases and probable
decisions under the ALI scheme. I concluded that only 40% of the issues would
probably be decided the same way under current practice and the ALI scheme. (To
be sure, the correlation was closer in non-consolidated cases: 55% in federal
diversity cases, 71% in federal statutory cases, and 63% in state court cases.)59
Explanations for the inconsistency between actual decisions and probable decisions
under the ALI scheme may have to do with the relative weight placed by the ALI
scheme on such factors as domicile, place of wrong, and lexfori. More likely,
however, is the probability'that current practice borders on randomness and that the
courts need more guidance.'
IfOregon were to codify the actual pattern of decisions in its modem conflicts
jurisprudence, the general and residual rule might be a forum preference, in the
absence of compelling reasons for applying foreign law. The most compelling
57. For a useful bibliography, see Shreve, supra note 35, at 393.
58. James A.R. Nafziger, Choice ofLaw in Air Disaster Cases: Complex Litigation Rules and
the Common Law, 54 La. L. Rev. 1001, 1013-14 (1994).
59. /d.at 1013.

60. Id.
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reasons that Oregon courts have been able to find are premised in a preponderant
gravity of contacts or on the basis of statutory construction. Thus, courts have
concluded that an Oregon statute was not intended to be applied in a particular
multi-jurisdictional situation or that a foreign jurisdiction had clearly expressed an
overarching interest in having its law applied in such a situation.
It is not necessary to be shackled by practice, however. Why shouldn't Oregon
legislate for the future rather than the past? Oregon might expand its horizons to
encompass innovative conflicts principles and rules. In the context ofcontracts, for
example, Oregon might strengthen the rule of party autonomy and the principle of
validation. In the torts context, statutory rules might incorporate the distinction
between conduct-regulating rules, which are often territorial, and loss-allocating
rules, which are not apt to be territorial. Another candidate for legislative
consideration might be a "victim's choice" rule in cases involving liability for
products entered into the mainstream of commerce.
One troublesome and increasingly prominent issue that may merit particular
attention relates to environmental pollution insurance. 6' Disputes may arise
between an insurer and insured concerning coverage for the costs ofinvestigating
and cleaning up environmental contamination. For example, a comprehensive
general liability (CGL) insurance policy may contain an exclusion for pollution
damage subject to a pro-coverage exception in the instance of sudden and
accidental damage.62 The laws of some states would broadly interpret such an
exception to cover gradually discharged pollution, whereas the laws of other states
would not. A conflicts issue may therefore arise whenever toxic waste is taken for
disposal from one state to a second state and the two states have opposing
interpretations of the 'exception for sudden and accidental damage. With
respect to issues related to contracts of fire, surety or casualty insurance
generally, the Restatement (Second) provides for choice of the law of the
principal location of an insured risk unless another state has a more significant
relationship to a transaction and the disputing parties.63 In practice, when insured
parties have initiated legal action against insurers, a phantom principle seems to
have been at work that normally favors the insured parties. The court's rationale
has been either that the law ofthe place of risk would favor an insured party or, if
that does not work, that any of several construed relationships with the other
jurisdiction are controlling.' If such a result is just in most cases, a forthright rule
to that effect would seem to be preferable to a phantom rule that encourages judicial
hocus pocus.

61. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Needfor a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a Proposal
for Tort Conflicts), 75 Ind. L. J. (not yet published) (2000) ("during the last two decades, we have
witnessed a virtual explosion in litigation involving disputes about insurance coverage for
environmental pollution").
62. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire,870 P.2d at 260.

63.

Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 193 (1971).

64.

See Tetley, supra note 34, at 368-70. See also St. Paul Fire,870 P.2d at 260. There is a

counter-tendency, however, that has resulted from an increasing number of actions in presumably
insurer-friendly or at least friendlier jurisdictions.
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In Oregon, however, the choice-of-law process in cases of environmental
pollution/cleanup insurance is somewhat different. Oregon's new Environmental
Cleanup Assistance Act provides that Oregon law shall be applied whenever the
contaminated property to which an action between an insured and an insurer relates
is located within the state. However, common law rules governing choice-of-law
determinations for sites outside the state continue to apply. In such cases, what are
the Oregon rules? St. PaulFirev. McCormick and Baxter establishes that the
location ofa particular risk (in that case, California) is not controlling. Instead, the
"public policy of Oregon should prevail" in actions involving out-of-state sites
whenever the foreign state's only contact with the dispute is as the site of the
contamination, when disputed liability policies were issued and countersigned
within Oregon (reflecting the state's regulatory interest, presumably), and when the
insured is an Oregon corporation with its principal place of business in Oregon
(reflecting a protective interest, presumably). Beyond that scenario, the choice-oflaw rules are unclear.
Since the 1960s, when the Oregon courts first abandoned multilateralist,
jurisdiction-selecting rules in tort and contract conflicts, they have consistently
adhered to the idea of unilateralist, law-selecting approaches based on an
examination ofthe intended or otherwise appropriate reach ofostensibly conflicting
laws. An innovative unilateralist approach, for application in both tort and contract
cases, might be to develop something along the lines ofproposed "multistate canons
ofconstruction,""5 which operate as default rules to avoid unnecessary exercises in
conflicts analysis.
The preferred approach for Oregon might, however, extend beyond
unilateralism. A foreign scholar has perceived a trend in American conflicts
jurisprudence from interest analysis to what he describes as equity analysis, in a
Proposed canons include the following:
A. A Comparative Impairment Canon: Ifthere is aconflict between two states' laws, and
failure to apply one of the laws would tender it practically ineffective, that law should be

65.

applied.
B. A Substance/Procedure Canon: In a conflict between a substantive policy and a
procedural policy,the lawreflecting the substantive policy should prevail unless the forum's
procedural interest is so strong that the forum should dismiss on grounds offorum non
conveniens.
C. A Canon for Contract Cases: In contract cases, true conflicts should be resolved by
applying the law chosen by the parties, or, if no express choice is made, by applying
whichever law validates the contract.
D. A Canon for Laws that are Obsolete: Where one of two conflicting laws is obsolete
(i.e., inconsistent with prevailing legal and social norms in the state that enacted it), the
other law should be applied.

E. A Canon for Actual Reliance Interests: Where two laws conflict, but the parties
actually and reasonably relied on one of them, that law should be applied.
Kramer, supranote 15, at 323-38.
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variety ofcontexts including products liability, personal injury,environmental, and
workers' compensation conflicts.' In view of this trend, it might be worth
exploring the possibility of moving, as to some issues at least, toward a more
substantive approach that would scrap the medievalism of defining significant
contacts and interests in favor of a more straightforward quest for justice in the
individual case. Conflict-of-law rules may be orphans. The role of sovereign
authority is ambiguous at best when disputes, by definition, fall between the
.sovereign cracks. It seems appropriate, therefore, for a court to fashion what it
regards as the best compromise to produce a just result. Ultimately, this is what
"better rule" jurisdictions have in mind in describing themselves as "justice

administering."67
Even the better rule approach, however, is unilateral in the sense oflimiting the
alternatives to whatever rules are supplied by the jurisdictions whose laws are
ostensibly in conflict. Special substantive rules for multistate problems," a general
commitment to material justice even if it might not product conflicts justice, 9 or
"best law" analysis70 transcend this limitation out of an awareness of both the
dilemma and the opportunity presented by conflict oflaws. It has been ably argued,
for example, that loss-allocating conflicts rules in tort cases merit a substantive
approach.7 Similarly, conflicts between liability-limiting rules may best be
resolved by either compromise or a compensation principle, both substantive
considerations.
To suggest the possibility of a more substantive resolution ofsome conflicts is
not to suggest that it would be at all wise to avoid some analysis ofelements such
66.
67.

Tetley, supra note 34, at 372.
See, e.g., the classic case of Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1973).

68. See Arthur T. von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role
and Significance in Contemporary Choice ofLaw Methodology, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 347 (1974).

69.

See Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice (1993).
See Luther L. McDougal Ill, Toward Application ofthe Best Rule ofLaw in Choice ofLaw
Cases, 35 Mercer L. Rev. 483 (1984).
71. Loss-allocating rules are different. These rules-including negligence, strict liability,
and defenses to non-intentional torts-are such because they are backward looking. Their
dominant purpose is to look back to an unplanned transaction, paradigmatically an accident,
to determine who should bear the loss and in what proportion.... Loss-allocating rules...
look back to unplanned events and attempt to assign the loss justly. Predictability matters
less because the liability-creating event is unplanned. Of course, the mostjust manner for
the allocation of loss can be, and often is,controversial, and courts frequently struggle
visibly with these decisions.
However, if courts are to approach conflicts of loss-allocating rules pragmatically and
fulfill the substantive values underlying these rules, they must assess the justice of the
competing rules. Any non-pragmatic approach will promote justice only by happenstance.
It matters not whether the choice is based on the place of the accident (as the First
Restatement counseled), the domiciles of the parties (as Currie counseled), a combination
of the two (as the Second Restatement counseled), the alphabetical ordering of the states,
or the flip of a coin. Any approach that fails to consider the justice of the competing
methods of apportioning the loss will inevitably apportion the loss unjustly in some cases,
and thereby frustrate the substantive values.
Patrick J.Borchers, Conflicts Pragmatism, 56 AIb. L.Rev. 883, 897-99 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
70.
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as significant contacts, governmental interests, policies underlying conflicting laws,
and expectations of the parties, that are essential to modem choice-of-law theory.
It is not even to suggest that multilateralist (territorialist) goals and rules should be
declared dead. It is, however, to suggest a justice-administering alternative to the
confusion of Oregon's current eclecticism.
IV. CONCLUSION

Some twenty-five years ago, a leading conflicts scholar concluded that choiceof-law jurisprudence was "being lifted up by the courts to a well-watered plateau
high above the sinkhole it once occupied."72 Symeon Symeonides concluded his
73
meticulous exegesis ofLouisiana's statute for tort conflicts on a more modest note.
He expressed the hope that the Louisiana project, so ably accomplished under his
leadership, at least would enable others to learn from and avoid its mistakes or
compromises and perhaps, more positively, would demonstrate that conflicts
problems are susceptible to legislative solutions.74
Dean Symeonides expressed the further hope that the Louisiana project would
also demonstrate that "lessons of modem choice-of-law theories are capable of
being compressed into statutory rules."" It is with this expectation that the Oregon
Law Commission has set forth, as the second in the nation, to translate choice-oflaw theory into legislative action. There will be sinkholes to be inspected and
avoided as well as new ground to be plowed and sowed. "No location lasts forever,
and there are vistas beyond the plateau." 6
Given the confusion of methodology and result in Oregon's continuing
experiment with modem choice-of-law thinking, statutory rules may make a
particularly important contribution to judicial decisions in this state. Oregon's
project to codify choice-of-law rules provides a salient example of a law reform
body's availability to mediate between the judicial and legislative branches of state
government.77

72. Robert A. Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Spring 1977, at 10, 26.

73. Symeonides, Louisiana Tort Conflicts, supra note 3, at 766-67. See also Symeon C.
Symeonides, Exploring the "Dismal Swamp":

The Revision of Louisiana's Conflicts Law on

Successions, 47 La. L. Rev. 1029, 1101-02 (1987) ("The Louisiana Draft [on the law ofsuccession]
does not aspire to be the model for [a process of rule-making]. What is hoped, however, is that the
Draft can serve as a point of reference in [the debate concerning the role of conflicts rules].").
74. Id. at 767.
75. Id.

76.

Leflar, supra note 72, at 26 (concluding with the observation that the well-watered plateau

of choice-of-law was a "rest stop now.").
77. Vetri, supra note 1,at 205.
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ANNEX
OREGON CHOICE-OF-LAW CASES: 1986-2000
(in reverse chronological order)
STATE CASES

Case Summary

Mutual ofEnumclaw Ins. Co. v. Payne,
993 P.2d 186 (Or. App. 1999).
1. Facts: The plaintiff, a Washington
insurance company, issued in Washington an
automobile liability insurance policy to the
defendant's employer that covered several
vehicles registered and garaged in
Washington and one to the defendant
covering a vehicle registered and garaged in
Oregon. The defendant, the insured's
employee, is an Oregon resident who
suffered injuries when he was struck while
standing on a road in Oregon near his
vehicle by a truck driven by an uninsured
motorist. He claimed that he had stopped to
help direct traffic at the scene of an accident.
The uninsured motorist and personal injury
protection sections of the insured's policy
limited coverage to persons injured while
"occupying" the vehicle. Oregon law would
interpret the word "occupying" narrowly to
exclude the defendant from coverage.
Washington statutory law, however,
broadened the definition of "occupying" to
include all persons "using" an insured
vehicle, as in the defendant's case. A
conformity clause specified that "terms of
this policy which are in conflict with the
statutes of the State where this policy is
issued [i.e., Washington] are amended to
conform to such statutes."
2. Choice-of-law Issue: Did Washington's
conformity clause apply so as to extend
insurance coverage to an Oregon resident
involved in an Oregon accident or would
Oregon law apply so as to bar recovery by
the defendant?

Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law
1. Stated methodology:
Unclear, but the court seems
to accept the materiality of
the most significant
relationship test.
2. Application: Statutory
construction, as elaborated in
case law. The court held that
the conformity clause under
Washington law applies only
to vehicles registered and
garaged in Washington.
Thus, Washington, having
little or no express interest in
protecting an Oregon
defendant, did not have the
most significant relationship
with the policy as the
defendant had argued.
3. Choice ofLaw: Oregon
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Case Summary

Webber v. Olsen, 971 P.2d 448 (Or. App.
1998).
1. Facts:A decedent's widow and children
brought action against the decedent's former
wife, claiming that they, rather than she,

were entitled to proceeds ofthe decedent's
life insurance policy. The decedent and his
former wife had resided in Oregon at the
time the policy was purchased. The husband
moved to California and the couple
dissolved their marriage. The husband,
having married the plaintiff wife, attempted
to change his designation of beneficiaries in
the insurance policy. His notification of the
change conformed with Oregon's lenient
standard for notification but not California's.
2. Choice-of-law issue: Did Oregon's
lenient standard for notification of a change
ofbeneficiary apply so as to entitle the
plaintiffs to insurance proceeds or did
California's higher standard for notification
apply so as to defeat the plaintiffs' claim?

[Vol. 60

Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law
1. Statedmethodology:
Three-step test: Are the
contending laws actually in
conflict? If so, do either or
both jurisdictions have a
substantial interest in the
dispute? Are Oregon's
interests so important that the
court should not apply the
foreign law?
2. Application:Gravity of
contacts, citing Lilienthal's
interest-based most
significant relationship test
and noting the lack of
evidence of any overriding
Oregon policy.
3. Choice ofLaw:
California
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Angelini v. Delaney, 966 P.2d 223 (Or.
App. 1998), review denied, 987 P.2d 514
(Or. 1999).
1. Facts: In a quiet title action brought by
the California owners of a mobile home park
in Oregon, the defendants-a California
corporation and a California principal of the
same corporation-brought several
counterclaims. The counterclaims arose out
ofthird-party loans made in California for
the benefit of the park; these loans had been
satisfied by the manager. The court
identified only one difference between
California and Oregon law, and that
difference was immaterial: California's
shorter statute of limitations.
2. Choice-of-law issue: Does Oregon law
apply to a dispute involving a California
corporation and several California residents
arising out of loans made in California to pay
necessary management expenses of a mobile
home park located in Oregon?
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Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law

1. Stated methodology:
Unclear but apparently a
two-step test under the
Restatement (Second):
Whether "there is a material
difference between Oregon
substantive law and the law
of the other forum. If there is
no material difference-if
there is a 'false
conflict'--Oregon law
applies."
2. Application: Two-step
test, the first step of which
presumably resolved the
choice-of-law issue because
the plaintiffs failed to carry
the burden to prove "material
differences in the applicable
substantive law of Oregon
and California."
3. Choice ofLaw: Oregon
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Case Summary

Holder v. Elg, 948 P.2d 763 (Or. App.
1997).
1. Facts:An Idaho state court awarded
judgments for plaintiffs, including attorney
fees, on two promissory notes. Both notes
contained attorney fee provisions in the
event of a successful action to collect on
them. When the Idaho judgments were
entered, Idaho law, unlike Oregon law, did
not recognize the right of post-judgment
attorney fees. The plaintiffs sought
enforcement of the judgments in Oregon in
accordance with the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act. After the
defendants failed to satisfy the judgments,
the plaintiffs pursued enforcement in both
Oregon and California, where the defendants
owned real and personal property. The
plaintiffs later brought actions in Oregon and
California against the defendants under the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, alleging
that they had fraudulently transferred
property in both states in an attempt to avoid
satisfaction of the Idaho judgments.
2. Choice-of-law issue: Does Oregon's law
providing for the award of attorney fees
apply to a foreign judgment whose
enforcement is sought in an Oregon court or
does Idaho law, denying attorney's fees,
apply as part of an Idaho judgment?

Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law
1. Statedmethodology:
Most significant contacts,
with reference to a specific
Restatement (Second) rule.
2. Application: Gravity of
contacts, but noting a lack of
Idaho interest in an Oregon
collection action.
3. Choice ofLaw: Oregon
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Case Summary

Stricklin v. Soued, 936 P.2d 398 (Or. App.
1997).
1. Facts:The plaintiff was the holder by
assignment of a promissory note secured by
a trust deed executed in California on real
property there. The plaintiff claimed that the
Oregon defendants, as general partners of the
maker of the note, defaulted on it. California
law would require the plaintiff, as a secured
creditor, to proceed first against the security
before enforcing the underlying debt (the
"security first" rule). Oregon has no
"security first" requirement.
2. Choice-of-law issues: Is the California
security-first requirement procedural and
therefore non-applicable in Oregon
litigation, or substantive, thereby presenting
a conflict of laws? If the latter, which law
governs?
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Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law
1. Stated methodology:
After rejecting any
mechanical reliance on the
substantive-procedural
characterization, the court
undertook a "significant
contacts analysis" under a
two-part test.
2. Application:Weighing of
interests, after determining
that the issue was not one of
judicial administration
(corresponding, roughly
speaking, to a procedural
issue). The court based its
choice of law on the gravity
of contacts and the lack of a
paramount Oregon interest
other than the after-acquired
Oregon domicile by the
defendants in a transaction,
involving a California
promissory note secured by
California property. The
court could find no Oregon
interest in applying its policy
towards creditors and debtors
that is more important than
California's longstanding
interest in the application of
the "security-first" rule.
3. ChoiceofLaw:
California
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Case Summary

Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law

Zidell Marine Corp. v. West Painting,Inc.,
894 P.2d 481 (Or. App. 1995).

1. Stated methodology:
None. The majority ignored
the choice-of-law issue.

1. Facts: The plaintiff brought an action to
determine priority among competing claims
to money the plaintiff owed defendant.
West, a Washington corporation, which
owed money to the other defendants.
According to U.C.C. §9-103, as enacted in
Oregon, whether the defendant Capital had a
perfected security interest depended on
whether it properly filed a financing
statement in Washington, the state where the
debtor was located. Even though the trial
court mentioned that a financing statement
was filed in Washington, neither it nor its
contents were in the record.
2. Choice-of-law issue: Is there a perfected
security interest when it is uncertain from the
record that a financing statement was filed in
Washington, the state where the debtor is
located?

2. Application:None
3. Dissent: Statutory
construction under the UCC
revealed the choice-of-law
issue. Washington and not
Oregon law would apply to
decide whether there was a
perfected interest when the
debtor was located in
Washington.
4. Choice of Law: Oregon
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Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law

Cropp v. Interstate Distrib. Co., 880 P.2d
464 (Or. App.), review denied, 887 P.2d 791
(Or. 1994).

1. Stated methodology:
Unclear, but perhaps
statutory construction.

1. Facts: The plaintiffs were self-employed,
truck drivers who lived in Oregon and
worked in five states, including Oregon.
They brought an action against the
defendants seeking money damages for
personal injuries and property damage that
they sustained when a truck, owned by a
Washington defendant and driven by a
Nevada defendant, collided with their own
parked truck in California. Both defendants
worked mainly in California. California's
one-year statute of limitations would bar the
action whereas Oregon's two-year statute
would allow it.

2. Application:
Neoterritorialism. Plaintiff's
allegations concern the
parties' rights and
responsibilities in operating
motor vehicles on California
highways. Therefore, its law
applies.

2. Choice-of-law issue: Does Oregon's
Uniform Conflict of Laws Limitations Act
require application of the California statute
to bar an action allowable under Oregon's
statute insofar as the underlying claim is
substantively based on a California accident?

3. Dissent: Applying the
most significant relationship
test, as set forth in the
Restatement (Second),four
questions must be asked.
1) Is there an actual conflict?
2) Does Oregon have a
substantial interest in the
outcome of the disputed
issue? 3) Does the other
state have a substantial
interest in the outcome of the
disputed issue? 4) If there is
a conflict, which state has a
greaterinterest in the
outcome of the dispute?
California's only relationship
to the action, the place ofthe
accident, is fortuitous. Any
interest it might have in
traffic safety is met by
enforcement of its traffic
laws. The more significant
contacts of residence and
economic impact are with
Oregon.
4. Choice ofLaw:
California
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Case Summary

St. Paul Fire & MarineIns. Co., v.
McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co., 870
P.2d 260 (Or. App.), modified, 875 P.2d 537
(Or. App. 1994), aff'd in part, rev 'din part,
923 P.2d 1200 (Or. 1996).
1. Facts: Insurers, none of them Oregon
carriers, brought an action against the
insured operator ofwood treatment plants,
an Oregon corporation, seeking a declaration
of coverage under various liability policies.

Most, if not all, of the insurance policies
were issued by an Oregon insurance broker
and were countersigned in Oregon. As a
result of defendant's operations in Oregon
and California, chemicals had contaminated
the soil and groundwater. The substantive
issues were whether damage had to manifest
itself to trigger coverage and whether
damage was within an exception to pollution
exclusion for sudden and accidental
discharge. The court did not identify any
material difference between the ostensibly

conflicting laws.
2. Choice-of-law issue: Does Oregon have a
substantial interest in applying its insurance
laws to determine the rights and duties of the
parties to insurance policies protecting
California operations by California insurers,
when the owner ofthe plant was from
Oregon, and most, if not all of the policies
were issued and countersigned in Oregon?

[Vol. 60

Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law
1. Stated methodology:
Unclear, but the court cited
Lilienthal.
2. Application: Mere
contacts were insufficient,
but weighing of interests and
public policy to resolve the
conflict was instrumental.
3. Choice ofLaw: Oregon
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Case Summary

Stubbs v. Weathersby, 869 P.2d 893
(Or.App. 1994), aft'd, 892 P.2d 991 (Or.
1995).
1. Facts: A mother objected to the petition
for adoption of her child filed by Oregon
residents and based on the mother's written
consent given in Washington. The consent
complied with Oregon law but it lacked the
formalities required by Washington law.
2. Choice-of-law issue: Does Washington
or Oregon law apply to determine the
validity of a mother's consent, the Oregon
court having established jurisdiction over a
petition for adoption?
Fiedler v. Bowler, 843 P.2d 961 (Or. App.
1992).
1. Facts:A creditor brought an action to
collect on a note secured by four houses in
Indiana. Under Oregon law, unlike Indiana
law, the prevailing party may be awarded
attorney fees if the note allows award of
them to any party. The note itselfprovided
for Indiana law to be applied, apparently in
the event of a dispute arising out of the note.
2. Choice-of-law issue: Does Oregon public
policy override a note's choice of Indiana
law to allow an award of attorney fees on a
claim based on the note?
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Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law
1. Stated methodology:
Restatement (Second).
2. Application: Restatement
(Second) and statutory
construction. Once "home
state" jurisdiction over an
adoption proceeding has been
decided under the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act (UCCJA), no choice-oflaw problem arises. The law
of the forum applies.
3. Choice ofLaw: Oregon

1. Stated methodology:
Enforcement of choice-oflaw provision "unless doing
so would circumvent a
fundamental public policy of
Oregon law."
2. Application: Defendants
did not identify any public
policy basis to constrain the
parties' choice-of-law
provision.
3. Choice of Law: Indiana
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Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law

Case Summary

Manz v. Continental Am. Life Ins. Co., 843
P.2d 480 (Or. App. 1992).
1. Facts: The plaintiff, an Oregon resident,
brought this action to recover amounts
allegedly due under a group health insurance
policy issued by defendant, a Pennsylvania
resident, and held by an Illinois trustee. The
policy covered the employees of a
Washington business and their dependents.
After incurring medical expenses that were
covered under the terms of the policy, the
plaintiff submitted a claim. The defendant
denied that claim because it believed that the
enrollment card submitted by the plaintiff's
husband misrepresented the plaintiff's
medical history. The defendant argued that
under applicable Illinois law, unlike
Washington law, it could rely on the material
misrepresentation contained on the
enrollment card to support its defense. This
was so even if the insurer had not provided
the insured with a copy of the statements for
his review when it issued the insurance
policy.

1. Stated methodology:
Two-part test: Is there an
actual conflict? If so, under
the Restatement (Second),

which state has the most
significant contacts showing
that the state has an interest
in having its law applied to
the dispute?
2. Application: Two-part
test: The court concluded,
somewhat summarily, that
Illinois "has no interest"
simply because it is the
physical situs of the group
master policy. The court
determined that the one
contact Illinois had with this
dispute, as the location of the
trust over the group master
policy, did not engage a state
interest. Washington's
interest is expressed in its
insurance code, which covers
all Washington insurance
transactions. Consequently
Washington has the most
significant contacts with the
dispute.

2. Choice-of-law issue: Should Washington
or Illinois law apply to a claim based on a
group insurance policy held by an Illinois
trustee, but offered, accepted, and to be
performed in Washington?

___________________________________________________
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3. Choice ofLaw:
Washington law (Oregon law
was not at issue, although the
plaintiff argued that an
Illinois statute incorporated
Oregon law).

A
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Case Summary

Allen v. American Hardwoods,795 P.2d
592 (Or. App. 1990).
1. Facts:An Oregon workers' compensation
insurer sought distribution of third-party
settlement proceeds for non-economic losses
obtained from a Michigan company by a
deceased worker's beneficiary and an injured
worker, both of whom were Oregon
residents. The underlying claims related to
an accident in Michigan. The agreement
between the parties contained a
choice-of-law provision adopting Michigan
law, which, unlike Oregon law, did not allow
reimbursement to a workers' compensation
insurer of a settlement for non-economic loss
only.
2. Choice-of-law issue: Does Oregon law
apply so as to allow a claim for the
distribution of a third-party settlement
initiated by an Oregon workers'
compensation insurer against two Oregon
residents, or does Michigan law, insulating
proceeds from the insurer's reach, apply on
the basis that the underlying accident was in
Michigan and the workers settled with a
Michigan company an issue ofnoneconomic losses under a Michigan
choice-of-law provision?

Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law
1. Stated methodology:
Restatement (Second)
principles and black-letter
rules.
2. Application:The issue of
defendant's rights to share in
the settlement proceeds
concerned the relationship of
an Oregon worker, an
Oregon workers'
compensation carrier and,
indirectly at least, an Oregon
employer. The court agreed
with a determination by the
Oregon Workers'
Compensation Board that
Michigan had no substantial
interest within the framework
of the Restatement (Second)
in protecting Oregon workers
from the reach of an Oregon
insurer. Oregon, however,
had a vital interest in
applying its law to protect an
Oregon insurer.
3. Choice ofLaw: Oregon
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Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law

Perez v. Coast to Coast Reforestation Corp.,
785 P.2d 365 (Or. App. 1990).

1. Stated methodology:
Unclear.

1. Facts:The plaintiffs, Oregon residents,
were recruited in Oregon to perform
reforestation work in Idaho by the
defendants, Oregon residents. The plaintiffs
sued farm contractors for unpaid wages and
penalties under Oregon's Farm Labor
Contractors Act. Idaho, on the other hand,
did not provide such protection to
farmworkers.

2. Application:Controlling
Oregon-based statute that
"embodies a strong public
policy" reflects an important
fundamental interest in farm
worker transactions in
Oregon between Oregon
workers and employers. The
court also mentioned the
strong public policy and
important fundamental
interest of Oregon in cases
arising under the Act. Idaho
did not have a similar statute.

2. Choice-of-law issue: Does Oregon law
apply so as to protect a farm worker under a
contract signed in Oregon by Oregon parties,
to be performed in Idaho, or does Idaho's
non-protective law apply because of the
worksite there?
Dabbs v. Silver Eagle Mfg. Co., 779 P.2d
1104 (Or. App.), review denied, 784 P.2d
1101 (Or.1989).
1. Facts: Tennessee residents brought a
product liability claim against an Oregon
company for injuries suffered in Tennessee
resulting from an alleged defect in a product
designed and manufactured in Oregon and
sold in Tennessee. The claim was within
Oregon's statute of limitations but beyond
the time limitation of Tennessee's statute.
2. Choice-of-law issue: In a products
liability action does an Oregon manufacturer
have a vested right to a Tennessee
limitations defense where the alleged injuries
were suffered in Tennessee, by Tennessee
residents, from a product sold in Tennessee?

3. Choice ofLaw: Oregon
1. Stated methodology:
Two-step analysis: Is there a
choice-of-law issue engaging
substantial interests and
policies of both states? If so,
which state has the "most
significant relationship" with
the dispute?
2. Application: Restatement
(Second) principles and
black-letter rules.
3. Choice of Law: Oregon
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Case Summary

IndustrialIndem. v. Pacific Maritime
Ass'n, 777 P.2d 1385 (Or. App. 1989).
1. Facts: The plaintiff, a California
corporation, issued in California a standard
comprehensive general liability (CGL)
policy to the defendant, a California
corporation, and an association of 120
steamship, stevedore and terminal companies
that operate in Oregon, Washington and
California. Hill, an Oregon domiciliary,
filed a claim in federal court in Oregon
against the defendant and others. He alleged
that the local union had engaged in
intentional discriminatory conduct against
him in Oregon by refusing to afford him a
certain job assignment because of his race.
The indemnity contract was executed and to
be performed in California, where the insurer
and insured were domiciled. The plaintiff
filed this declaratory judgment action to
determine its responsibility, if any, for the
expenses incurred by the defendant in its
defense against Hill's claim. Under
California, but not Oregon, law, an insurer
must defend a claim that potentially seeks
damages within the coverage of the policy.
2. Choice-of-law issue: Should Oregon law
govern the allegations of a California insurer
under a policy issued in that state that
covered a California corporation doing
business in California, Oregon, and
Washington where the actions occurred in
Oregon?
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Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law
1. Stated methodology: Law
of the state with the most
contacts.
2. Application: California
had "the more significant
relationship" to the parties
and their insurance contract.
Also, as a matter of
multistate policy, an anomaly
ofcontract interpretation
would result if the laws of
three potential fora were
variously applied in three
separate actions.
3. Choice ofLaw: California
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Case Summary

Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law

StraightGrainBuilders v. TrackN' Trail,
760 P.2d 1350 (Or. App. 1988).
1. Facts:The plaintiff, an Oregon company,
brought a breach-of-contract action against a
California company. They had entered into
an unwritten, implied-in-fact contract in
California for the plaintiff to build stores in
California, although much of the material
used in the construction came from Oregon
and much of the labor was performed in
Oregon. One of the stores was designed by
an Oregon architect, who was also licensed
in California. The parties' relationship
originated in Oregon, where plaintiff's first
work for defendant was performed. They
met once in Oregon and twice in California
prior to the agreement to do the work
involved in this case. Under California but
not Oregon substantive law, all residential
and commercial builders must obtain
licenses. Contracts entered into without
doing so are "illegal and void."
2. Choice-of-law issue: Do California's
licensing requirements apply to render an
implied-in-fact contract for the construction
of commercial property in California null
and void when it would be valid under
Oregon law?

1. Stated methodology:
Lilienthal'sgeneral
approach, involving a
consideration ofthree
factors: Which state had the
most significant relationship
to the parties and the
transaction; the rule of
validation; and a
determination of whether the
interests ofOregon (its
'public policy') are so basic
and important that an Oregon
court should not apply
California law, despite its
significant connection with
the transaction.
2. Application: Gravity of
contact analysis, which
established that both states
had roughly equal contacts
with the parties and the
transaction. Oregon's
interest in protecting its
citizens was substantial. On
the other hand, California's
interest in protecting its
consumers from dishonesty
and incompetence was not
affected when neither had
been alleged. "Oregon's
public policy ofenforcing the
agreement between the
parties, together with the rule
of validation, outweighs
California's policy of
invalidating it and closing its
courts to such actions."
3. Choiceof Law: Oregon
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Case Summary

EquitableLife Assurance Soc'y v. McKay,
760 P.2d 871 (Or. 1988).
1. Facts: Plaintiff brought an action to
settle conflicting claims to the proceeds of
two life insurance policies issued to
decedent. Defendants are decedent's widow,
who claimed that the decedent actually had
intended that she be named as the
beneficiary, and decedent's children from a
previous marriage, named as the sole
beneficiaries. Washington's Deadman's
Statute, unlike Oregon's law, precluded the
widow and the insurance agent from
testifying about the decedent's intent. The
parties had stipulated that Washington's
substantive law applied to the action.
2. Choice-of-law issue: On certification of
the following question from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit: Under Oregon law, is the
Washington Deadman's Statute substantive
or procedural?
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Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law
1. Stated methodology:
Lilienthal's"significant
contacts" and Restatement
(Second) rules.
2. Application: The
characterization of a statute
as substantive or procedural
merely states a conclusion.
In Lilienthal the court
adopted a "significant
contacts" choice-of-law
analysis. The Restatement
(Second) establishes that
local law applies to rules
prescribing how litigation
must be conducted. The
court held that rules
governing such issues as
joinder of parties, pleading,
discovery, the admissibility
ofevidence, competence of
witnesses and witness
credibility relate to the
administration ofjustice.
The law of the forum state
applies to those matters.
3. ChoiceofLaw: Oregon
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Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law

Young v. Mobil Oil Corp., 735 P.2d 654
(Or. App. 1987).

1. Stated methodology:
Restatement (Second).

1. Facts: Mobil was a New York
corporation with headquarters in that state,
and Myers was a subsidiary of a California
corporation. Mobil entered into a contract
with Myers that was negotiated in California.
It provided that Myers would pick up oil
drums from Mobil's plant in Portland,
recondition them at its Portland plant and
return the drums to Mobil. Myers would
"indemnify and hold Mobil harmless against
all losses, expenses, liability and claims for
death, personal injury or property damage
arising out of the work hereunder by Myers
or any subcontractor or their agents or
employees." A choice-of-law clause in the
contract provided that New York law was to
govern disputes arising under it. An
employee of Myers suffered injuries at
Mobil's plant. As permitted by the workers'
compensation system, he and his wife
brought an action against Mobil. Mobil,
having filed a third-party complaint against
Myers, later settled with Myers' employee
and his wife. When Myers declined to
participate in the settlement, Mobil pursued
its contractual indemnity claim.

2. Application: Public
policy exception. The court
acknowledged that
choice-of-law clauses are
generally enforceable, but
that rule is not absolute. The
court held that contractual
indemnity clauses run
counter to Oregon's
fundamental public policy of
encouraging workplace
safety, as established by
Oregon's Workers'
Compensation Act. Oregon's
law must therefore be
applied.

2. Choice-of-law issue: Is a contractual
indemnity clause enforceable when it is
allowed by New York, the state whose law
was chosen by the parties, but would violate
the public policy of Oregon, the state where
the accident occurred?

3. Choice ofLaw: Oregon
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Case Summary

Warm Springs ForestProds. Indus. v.
Employee Benefits Ins Co., 716 P.2d 740
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Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law

(Or. 1986).

1. Stated methodology:
Construction ofcontract and
lack of evidence of opposing
tribal law.

1. Facts: The defendant, an Oregon
insurance company, made an oral promise to
the plaintiff, an Indian tribal entity, to rebate

2. Application: None

part of the premium of a policy for workers'

3. Dissent: With regard to

compensation coverage. Two provisions of

the tort claim, a Restatement

the policy referred to Oregon law, which

would not support an oral promise because it
was not "plainly expressed in the policy."
The plaintiff maintained, however, that the
contract must be enforced under tribal law,
within the framework of federal Indian law.
2. Choice-of-law issue: Does Oregon law
apply so as to deny an Indian tribal entity the
benefit ofan oral promise made on an Indian
reservation and to be performed there by an
Oregon insurance company in favor ofan
Indian tribal entity, or does tribal law apply
so as to enforce the promise?

(Second) identification of
significant contacts pointed
to the applicability ofWarm
Springs tribal law.
Provisions in the contract
referring to controlling
Oregon law were too
ambiguous to be reliable as a
basis for applying Oregon
laws. Warm Springs could
prove a "clearly more
important" interest than
Oregon. The allegations
would introduce evidence
from which one could
conclude that Warm Springs
had an overriding interest in
having its own law apply.
Tribal law should govern the
conduct of foreign businesses
which come onto the
reservation or initiate contact
with Warm Springs for the
purpose of making
representations that may
induce Warm Springs
divisions or enterprises to
contract with those
businesses rather than others.

4. Choice of Law: Oregon
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Stated Methodology,
Application and Choice of
Law

CitizensFirstBank v. Intercontinental
Express, Inc, 713 P.2d 1097 (Or. App.
1986).

1. Statedmethodology:
Most significant relationship
test.

1. Facts:The plaintiff, a Washington bank,

2. Application:Gravity of
contacts, coupled with an
observation that Washington
had no interest in whether the
plaintiff recovered attorney's
fees. The court deemed
Oregon to have the most
significant relationship to the
transaction and to the parties
because the checks were
drawn and delivered in
Oregon by an Oregon
company on the Oregon
branch of a bank, and
defendant stopped payment
and refused to pay them in
Oregon.

commenced an action to recover damages

arising out of defendant's refusal to pay two
checks. The defendant is an Oregon

corporation with its principal place of
business in Oregon. It issued the checks

payable to one Sero and delivered them to
him in Portland. The checks were drawn on
the Portland branch ofthe Bank of
California. Sero deposited the checks in his
account at the plaintiff's branch in
Washington. When the defendant stopped
payment of the checks, the plaintiff
demanded payment on the checks from the
defendant. Although the plaintiff received a
judgment in its favor, it was denied
attorney's fees under Washington law.
2. Choice-of-law issue: Does Oregon law
apply so as to permit an award of attorney's
fees in a suit successfully brought by a
Washington bank against an Oregon
corporation which had stopped payment on
checks drawn on an Oregon bank and
delivered in Oregon, or does Washington
law apply so as to deny attorney's fees?

3. Choice ofLaw: Oregon
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ANNEX
OREGON CHOICE-OF-LAW CASES: 1998-2000
(in reverse chronological order)
FEDERAL CASES
Case Summary

389 OrangeSt. Partnersv. Arnold, 170
F.3d 1200 (9th Cir.), amendedand
superseded,179 F.3d 656 (9th Cir. 1999).
1. Facts:An employer, the Portland Trail
Blazers of the National Basketball
Association, brought an interpleader action
against one of its players, Cliff Robinson,
and a lender to determine the appropriate
recipient of the employee's wages under an
assignment and agreement between the
employee and the lender, secured by the
employee's real property in Connecticut.
The employee cross-claimed against the
lender and another, asserting injury as a
result of the lender's fraud, misrepresentation
and other tortious conduct in Connecticut.
The lender filed a cross-claim for payment
due on a promissory note. The lenders were
Connecticut residents, the relationship
between the parties was centered there, the
allegedly fraudulent documents were signed
there, and the secured property was there.

Under Connecticut's statute of limitations,
unlike Oregon's, the employee's crossclaims
would be barred.
2. Choice-of-law issue: Does Connecticut's
statute of limitations apply so as to bar an
Oregon defendant's cross-claim against a
Connecticut defendant for questionable
practices allegedly committed in Connecticut

and related to real property there?

Stated Methodology,
Application, and Choice of
Law
1. Statedmethodology:
Restatement (Second).
2. Application: Gravity of
contacts. In tort actions, the
Restatement (Second)
focuses on the places of
injury, conduct, domicile,
nationality, incorporation,
business, and relationship,
which were mostly in
Connecticut. The only
Oregon factor was the
domicile ofone of the
defendants. Under the
Oregon Uniform Conflict of
Laws-Limitations Act, when
an underlying claim is
substantively based upon the
law of another state, its
limitation period also
applies.
3. Choiceof Law:
Connecticut
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Case Summary

Pallen v. United Parcel Gen. Serv. Services
Co., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (D.Or. 1998)
(and companion cases).
1. Facts: UPS employees brought suit
against UPS and other companies for injuries
caused by the use of hand-held computers in
performance of their jobs. None of the
parties were Oregon residents. Some of the
defendants did not conduct business in
Oregon and none of the injuries occurred in
Oregon. The computers were neither
designed nor manufactured in Oregon. The
laws of Oregon differed materially from
those of other relevant states, however.
2. Choice-of-law issue: Does Oregon law or
the home state laws ofthe plaintiffs apply to
product liability claims, when none of the
plaintiffs were from Oregon, none of them
were injured in Oregon, some of the
defendants did not conduct business in
Oregon, and the computers were neither
designed nor manufactured in Oregon?
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Stated Methodology,
Application, and Choice of
Law

1. Stated methodology:
Two-step analysis: Is there
an actual conflict? Ifnot,
Oregon law applies. Do both
states have a substantial
interest in applying their
laws? Ifnot, the law of the
state with substantial
interests applies; if both have
a substantial interest, apply
the most significant
relationship approach of the
Restatement (Second).
2. Application: With regard
to the workers' compensation
issues, there was no conflict
because the parties agreed to
apply the laws of the home
states ofthe plaintiffs. With
regard to the negligence
claims, the parties agreed
that there was no conflict;
therefore the court applied
Oregon law. With regard to
the product liability claims,
the court found that there was
an actual conflict, citing
examples of Illinois law.
The coufrt concluded that
Oregon had neither a
substantial interest in
applying its product liability
laws, nor the most significant
relationship to the facts and
the parties. The reasons for
this conclusion were: 1)the
plaintiffs were not Oregon
residents; 2)the plaintiffs
were not injured in Oregon;

3) some of the defendants did
not conduct business in
Oregon; 4) the hand-held
computers were neither
designed nor manufactured in
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Case Summary

Stated Methodology,
Application, and Choice of
Law

Oregon.
3. Choice of Law: Home
state laws ofthe plaintiffs
applied to the workers'
compensation (by stipulation
between the parties) and
product liability claims.
Oregon law applied to the
negligence claims.

Frosty v. Textron, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 551
(D. Or. 1995).
1. Facts: The Oregon estate of a helicopter
pilot killed in a Washington air crash brought
a products liability action fifteen years later
against the helicopter's manufacturers. The
defendants were Delaware corporations with
their principal places of business in Rhode
Island and Texas but doing business in
Oregon. The complaint was based on
Oregon law.
2. Choice-of-law issue: Does Washington's
repose statute save an action otherwise
barred under Oregon's repose statute in a
products liability claim brought by the estate
of an Oregon resident under Oregon law
against two corporations doing business in
Oregon, when the place of the accident was
Washington?

1. Stated methodology:
Restatement (Second):
Under a two-step analysis, is
there an actual conflict? If
so, which state has the most
significant relationship to the
action?
2. Application: Statutory
construction and two-step
analysis. In an interesting
association of statutory
limitations and repose issues,
the court construed Oregon's
Uniform Conflict of LawsLimitation Act to establish a
false conflict between
Oregon and Washington laws
of repose.
3. Choice ofLaw: Oregon

